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Abstract
Modern network systems such as transportation, manufacturing, and communica-
tion systems are subject to cyber-physical disruptions. Cyber disruptions compromise
sensing and/or actuating which closed-loop control relies on, and physical disruptions
undermine network capability. This paper develops a novel approach to analysis and
design of traffic control for dynamic flow networks subject to a rather broad class of
disruptions. We consider a single-origin-single-destination acyclic network with possi-
bly finite link storage spaces. Both cyber and physical disruptions are modeled as a
set of discrete modes that modify the control and/or the network flow dynamics. The
network switches between various modes according to a Markov process. By consider-
ing switched, piecewise polynomial Lyapunov functions and exploiting monotonicity of
the network flow dynamics, we analyze network throughput under various disruption
scenarios and show that cyber-physical disruptions can significantly reduce network
throughput. For control design, we derive two results analogous to the classical max-
flow min-cut theorem: (i) for a network with observable disruption modes, there exist
mode-dependent controls that attain the expected-min-cut capacity; (ii) for a network
with infinite link storage spaces, there exists an open-loop control that attains the min-
expected-cut capacity. We also design a closed-loop control for general cases and derive
an explicit relation from the control to a lower-bound for throughput. Our approach
is illustrated by a series of numerical examples.
Keywords: Dynamic flow networks, cyber-physical disruptions, piecewise-deterministic
Markov processes, monotone dynamical systems.
1 Introduction
Dynamic flow networks are a class of useful models for a variety of engineering systems in-
cluding transportation systems, production lines, and communication networks [1, 2]. These
∗This work was in part supported by NYU Tandon School of Engineering and the C2SMART University
Transportation Center. The authors are with the Tandon School of Engineering, New York University,
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systems are subject to disruptions both in the physical part and in the cyber part. In the
physical part, link flows can be disrupted by capacity-reducing events such as traffic incidents
[3], station failures [4], and hardware malfunctions [5]. In the cyber part, real-time state ob-
servation and feedback actuation can be compromised by sensor or communication failures.
For example, the failure rate of traffic sensors in some transportation facilities can be as high
as 40% [6]. Similar challenges exist in production lines [7] and communication networks [8].
Cyber disruptions may degrade the effectiveness of feedback controllers and lead to losses in
the physical part [9]. Both types of disruptions are hard to predict and have to be modeled
as stochastic processes [5, 7, 8, 10]. Since network systems involve very large numbers of
cyber-physical components, it is neither economically feasible nor technically necessary to
prevent all disruptions. Instead, a practical solution is to integrate disruptions in modeling
to achieve resiliency-by-design [11]. However, limited models and methods have been devel-
oped for systematically analyzing network resiliency and designing control strategies in the
face of these disruptions.
In this paper, we develop a novel approach to evaluating network efficiency (in terms of
throughput and boundedness of delay) under the influence of cyber-physical disruptions and
designing control strategies that mitigate disruption-induced efficiency losses. Our method
applies to a rather general class of dynamic flow models, control actions, and disruptions. The
network can have either finite or infinite link storage spaces, and either smooth or non-smooth
flow functions. The control actions include dynamic routing and flow management (e.g. ramp
metering in transportation). We consider cyber disruptions including missing/faulty state
observation and physical disruptions including capacity drop and congestion propagation.
Based on the theory of piecewise-deterministic Markov processes and monotone dynamical
systems, we derive ready-to-use criteria for boundedness of traffic densities and characterize
the maximally attainable throughput under various classes of control laws. The examples in
this paper focus on transportation applications, but with minor modifications, our modeling,
analysis, and design methods can be applied to a general class of network systems facing
cyber-physical disruptions.
Previous work on dynamic flow networks typically focused on the nominal or the robust
setting. Many results have been developed for disruption-free networks [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19], which provide hints for the disruption-prone setting. Robust control strategies have
been developed in response to physical (i.e. link capacity) disruptions [20, 21]. Importantly,
Como et al. [22] developed tools for evaluating network resiliency under distributed routing
strategies against adversarial disturbances. However, robust control focuses on the worst
cases associated with major or catastrophic disruptions; for the non-catastrophic but recur-
rent disruptions considered in this paper, those approaches may be over-conservative and
inefficient [22]. In the stochastic setting, results have been developed for network stability
under capacity perturbations. Control design approaches have been developed for a single
server subject to capacity disruptions [10, 23]. Jin and Amin analyzed the stability under
capacity disruptions for networks that have special structures, such as parallel links [3] and
serial links [24]. However, limited results are available for general networks with finite link
storage spaces, and the current models hardly capture spillback in general, which is a major
challenge for network flow control. Cyber disruptions have been considered in a body of
work on generic fault-tolerant control; see e.g. [25]. Particularly for network systems, some
results have been developed for fault detection/correction [26] and resilient control design
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[27, 28]. However, limited results are available for control under stochastic sensing/actuating
faults.
We consider a single-origin-single-destination, acyclic network with a time-invariant in-
flow at the origin. Our model considers rather general flow dynamics and control actions;
importantly, it allows congestion propagation (i.e. spillback). We use finite-state Markov
process to model the occurrence and clearance of a broad class of cyber-physical disruptions.
Cyber disruptions can either modify the mapping from the true states to the observed states
(sensing faults) or disable/corrupt actuators so that no control instruction or a biased control
instruction is implemented (actuating faults), and physical disruptions can influence the flow
functions. The proposed model belongs to a class of models called piecewise-deterministic
Markov processes (PDMP), where continuous states (traffic densities) evolve according to
multiple sets of ordinary differential equations and a discrete state (modes) determines the
mode of the continuous dynamics [29]. Besides, our model is also related to stochastic hybrid
systems [30] and Markov jump systems [31].
With the PDMP network model, we study the impact of cyber-physical disruptions on
network throughput. We define throughput as the maximal inflow at the origin under which
the network can be stabilized, i.e. traffic densities in all links being bounded on average. Our
stability analysis is based on a Lyapunov-function approach [32] and properties of PDMPs
[29]. Although the generic theory is well developed, the implementation in our problem is
challenging due to the non-linear and possibly non-smooth flow dynamics. To address this
challenge, we utilize properties of the monotone dynamics [33, 34] of the network model to
establish an easy-to-check stability condition (Theorem 1). Our stability analysis contributes
to the literature on stochastic fluid models, which has been focusing on the steady-state
distribution of single or tandem links with Markovian inflow or capacity [5, 35, 36].
Next, we propose control design based on the stability analysis. In practice, a key chal-
lenge for resilient control is that one cannot always have a full observation of network states
and disruption modes. We focus on three typical cases. In the first case, the network
links may have finite storage spaces, and the system operator can observe disruption modes.
For this case, we show that there must exist a mode-dependent control that will attain
the expected-min-cut capacity of the network (Theorem 2). In the second case, all of the
network links have infinite storage space, and the system operator has no observation but
perfect knowledge of disruptions. For this case, we propose an open-loop control that attains
the min-expected-cut capacity of the network (Theorem 3). These results are analogous to
the classical max-flow min-cut theorem [37]. In the third case, the system observer can only
observe traffic densities. We propose a density-dependent control that mitigates congestion
spillback and provide a lower bound for the guaranteed throughput (Theorem 4). Finally,
we use numerical examples to demonstrate that our control design approach can enhance
the network resiliency.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the network flow model
with stochastic cyber-physical disruptions. Section 3 analyzes the network’s stability and
throughput under given control laws. Section 4 discusses resilient control design. Section 5
summarizes the main conclusions and mentions several future directions.
3
2 Dynamic flow network with cyber-physical disrup-
tions
Consider a single-origin-single-destination, acyclic network with a set of directed links K =
{1, 2, . . . , K}. Without loss of generality, we assume that there exists an origin link numbered
as link 1 and a destination link numbered as link K; see Figure 1. The origin is subject to
a constant inflow of α ∈ R≥0. Let Xk(t) be the traffic density of link k at time t. For link k
with finite storage space, Xk(t) can only take values from a closed interval [0, x
max
k ], where
xmaxk is called the jam density. For link k with infinite storage space, Xk(t) can take value
from R≥0. In particular, we assume that link 1 has infinite storage space; this ensures that no
traffic is rejected at the origin. We use Xk to denote the set of Xk(t) and use X =
∏
k∈KXk
to denote the set of the state vector X(t).
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Figure 1: Network structure
We use Ok (resp. Ik) to denote the set of downstream (resp. upstream) adjacent links for
each link k ∈ K. We also let Np :=
∑
k∈K|Ok| denote the total number of pairs of adjacent
links. We say that link k is accessible from link i if there exists a directed path starts with
link i and ends at link k. For each link k ∈ K, let Mk ⊆ K be the set of links from which
link k is accessible, and let Nk ⊆ K be the set of links that are accessible from link k.
In the rest of this section, we first define the flow functions, control laws, and disruption
modes (Section 2.1), and then specify the network’s dynamics as a piecewise-deterministic
Markov process (Section 2.2). Finally, we define network stability and throughput (Sec-
tion 2.3).
2.1 Flow, control, and disruptions
In the following, we introduce some definitions and assumptions that are essential for our
network model. We also provide examples to illustrate the applicability of our modeling
approach.
2.1.1 Flow functions
The sending flow out of link k is specified by a function fk : Xk → R≥0. The receiving flow
into link k is specified by a function rk : Xk → R≥0. We assume that the flow functions fk
and rk satisfy the following:
Assumption 1 (Monotone flow function).
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1. For each link k, the sending flow fk(xk) is continuous and non-decreasing in xk. Fur-
thermore, fk(0) = 0 and sup fk(xk) <∞.
2. For each link k, the receiving flow rk(xk) is continuous and non-increasing in xk.
Furthermore, rk(x
max
k ) = 0 for link k with finite storage space.
Then the capacity Fk is defined by
Fk := sup
xk∈Xk
min{fk(xk), rk(xk)},
which indicates the maximum available sending flow. We also define the critical density xck
as the smallest xk such that the sending flow attains the capacity value. Practically, a link
is typically considered as “congested” when the density exceeds the critical density.
Below are several examples of practical flow functions.
(i) Road traffic: in the cell transmission model (CTM [38]), xk represents the density of
vehicles over a road section, and the sending flow out of the section is given by
fk(xk) = min{vxk, Fk},
where v is the free-flow speed and Fk is the capacity of the section. The receiving flow
into the kth section is
rk(xk) = Fk − w(xk − xck),
where w is the congestion-wave speed.
(ii) Production line: in manufacturing systems [39], xk measures the workload, and the
flow (or average throughput) out of a station can be modeled via the clearing function
fk(xk) =
Fkxk
+ xk
,
where  is a positive constant.
(iii) Data packets: in communication networks [5, 10], one can approximate the flow of
discrete packets as a fluid model. xk represents the number of packets waiting for
service. The flow out of a server can be approximated as
fk(xk) =
{
min{uk, Fk} if xk = 0,
Fk if xk > 0,
where uk is the inflow and Fk can be interpreted as the service rate. Since this flow
function is discontinuous in xk, the following flow function can be used as a simple but
useful approximation:
fk(xk) = Fk(1− e−ρkxk)
where ρk is a positive constant. The above is in fact a generic flow function that is
relevant to various applications [22].
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2.1.2 Control laws
We consider that the flows between links are controlled by a control law µ : X → RNp≥0. That
is, µkj(x) is the controlled flow from link k to link j. We assume that the control law µ
satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (Control law).
2.1 Continuity: The control law µ is at least piecewise-continuous in each xk.
2.2 Monotonicity:
(a) For each k ∈ K and j ∈ Ok, µkj(x) is non-decreasing in xk;
(b) For each k ∈ K and i ∈ Ik, µik(x) is non-increasing in xk.
2.3 Boundedness: let ∆y denotes the increment of variable y.
(a) For each k ∈ K, ∑j∈Ok ∆µkj is less than or equal to ∆fk as xk changes;
(b) For each k ∈ K, ∑i∈Ik ∆µik is less than or equal to ∆rk as xk changes.
Note that we only assume piecewise continuity but do not require smoothness; this makes
our approach applicable to a variety of non-smooth but practical models such as the CTM
[38]. Assumption 2.2 implies we only consider distributed control laws. Assumption 2.3
ensures that the response of control law is bounded as the sending flow or the receiving flow
changes. Below are several examples of practical control laws.
(i) Dynamic routing: a typical route choice model [40] is as follows
µkj(x) =
e−θjxj∑
`∈Ok e
−θ`x` fk(xk), ∀j ∈ Ok,
where θj quantifies the sensitivity of route choice to xj.
(ii) Ramp metering: suppose that link j is a section of highway and link k is an on-ramp
merging into the highway. A typical ramp metering policy is
µkj(x) = ukj − κkj(xj − xcj),
where ukj is the equilibrium on-ramp flow, κkj is a positive gain, and x
c
j is the critical
density of link j [41].
(iii) Max-pressure control: consider a link k with two incoming links I(k) = {i1, i2}. Then,
Pi1 := Fi1(xi1 − xk) and Pi2 := Fi2(xi2 − xk) can be viewed as the “pressure” from the
two incoming links [15]. The max pressure control prioritizes the flow from the link
with the maximal pressure:
µi1k(x) =
{
r¯k(xk) if Pi1 ≥ Pi2
r¯k(xk)− µi2k(x) otherwise,
µi2k(x) =
{
r¯k(xk)− µi1k(x) if Pi1 ≥ Pi2
r¯k(xk) otherwise.
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2.1.3 Disruption modes
We consider a set S of disruption modes, which may include cyber and/or physical disrup-
tions. In a mode with cyber disruptions, the control law µ, which is a mapping from link
state to inter-link flows, will be modified. The modification can be due to incorrect state
observation (sensing fault) or due to wrongly implemented control actions (actuating fault).
In a mode with physical disruptions, the flow functions fk and rk will be modified to capture
the capacity loss. To capture such modification, we introduce the mode s as a second argu-
ment into the flow functions and the control law. With a slight abuse of notation, we use
fk : S ×Xk → R≥0, rk : S ×Xk → R≥0 and µ : S ×X → RNp≥0 to denote the sending flow out
of link k, the receiving flow into link k and the control law under disruptions, respectively.
We assume that there exists a nominal model and that a disruption preserves the order of
flows:
Assumption 3 (Order-preserving disruptions).
1. There exists a nominal mode s0 ∈ S such that
fk(s0, x) = fk(x), rk(s0, x) = rk(x).
In other mode s 6= s0, sending and receiving flow might suffer bounded disruptions
f¯s,k ≤ sup fk(x) and r¯s,k ≤ sup rk(x) such that
fk(s, x) = min{fk(x), f¯s,k}, rk(s, x) = min{rk(x), r¯s,k}.
2. For each s ∈ S, µ(s, x) satisfies Assumption 2. Furthermore, if µkj(s, x) is non-
increasing (resp. non-decreasing) in xi, i ∈ K for some s ∈ S, then µkj(s′, x) is
non-increasing (resp. non-decreasing) in xi, i ∈ K, for all s′ ∈ S.
One can verify that, with order-preserving disruptions, the sending flow fk(s, x) and the
receiving flow rk(s, x) still satisfy Assumption 1. Then, we define the mode-specific link
capacities as
Fs,k := sup
xk∈Xk
min{fk(s, xk), rk(s, xk)}.
The above disruption model applies to a rather broad class of practical scenarios; below
are some examples:
(i) Capacity-reducing events: a failure mode typically has a capacity Fs,k that is smaller
than the nominal value.
Traffic incidents: fk(s, xk) = min{vxk, Fs,k}.
Server failure: fk(s, xk) = Fs,k(1− e−ρxk), where Fs,k = 0 when the server breaks
down.
(ii) Sensing faults: we can use a mapping Ts,k : S × X → X to capture various sensing
faults:
Bias: Ts,k(x) = xk + δs,k, where δs,k is a mode-dependent bias.
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Denial of service: Ts,k(x) = 0 for some link k; this means that no observation is
available for xk.
(iii) Actuating faults: consider the ramp metering strategy specified by [41]. Below are
several failure modes:
Disengagement: µkj(x) = fk(xk). That is, the ramp is not metered at all.
Bias: µkj(x) = u
s
kj − κkj(xj − xcj), where uskj can be disrupted from the default
value.
2.2 Piecewise-deterministic Markov model
With the definitions in the previous subsection, we can now define the piecewise-deterministic
dynamics of the controlled process {(S(t), X(t)); t ≥ 0}. The discrete-state process {S(t); t ≥
0} of the mode is a time-homogeneous finite-state Markov process that is independent of the
continuous-state process {X(t); t ≥ 0} of the traffic densities. The state space of the mode
process is S. The transition rate from mode s to mode s′ is λs,s′ . Without loss of generality,
we assume that λs,s = 0 for all s ∈ S. Hence, the discrete-state process evolves as follows:
Pr{S(t+ δ) = s′|S(t) = s} = λs,s′δ + o(δ), ∀s, s′ ∈ S.
where δ denotes an infinitesimal increment. We assume that the discrete-state process is
ergodic and admits a unique steady-state probability distribution {ps; s ∈ S} satisfying
ps
∑
s′ 6=s
λs,s′ =
∑
s′ 6=s
ps′λs′,s, ∀s ∈ S, (1a)
ps ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S, (1b)∑
s∈S
ps = 1. (1c)
The assumption of ergodicity essentially means that every disruption will be resolved in finite
time almost surely. The interpretation of the transition rates λs,s′ depends on the type of
transition. In practice, discrete-state transitions can represent the occurrence and clearance
of cyber-physical disruptions.
The continuous-state process {X(t); t ≥ 0} is defined as follows. Under a given control
law µ, the actual flow qµkj(s, x) from link k to link j is given by
qµkj(s, x) = min
{
µkj(s, x),
µkj(s, x)∑
`∈Ok µk`(s, x)
fk(s, xk),
µkj(s, x)∑
i∈Ij µij(s, x)
rj(s, xj)
}
. (2)
The three terms in min{·} are interpreted as follows. The first term is the control input,
i.e. the flow desired by the system operator. The second term is the flow that link k can
send, and the third term is the flow that link j can receive. The sending and receiving flows
are allocated proportionally to µkj(s, x), which is a standard modeling approach; for more
discussion on this and alternative models, see [42].
Note that if the control law µ, sending flow fk and receiving flow rk satisfy Assumption 3,
the actual flow qµkj(s, x) has the following lemma, which we prove in Appendix A.1.
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Lemma 1 (Monotone actual flow). For any k ∈ K and j ∈ Ok, qµkj(s, x) is non-decreasing
in xk; for any k ∈ K and i ∈ Ik, qµik(s, x) is non-increasing in xk.
A key novelty in our modeling approach is that we allow the system operator (SO) to send
non-admissible control inputs. This feature is essential for capturing the impact of cyber-
physical disruptions. If the control law is properly designed and if there are no disruptions,
then typically we have qµkj(s, x) = µkj(s, x). That is, the control law will never request a flow
that the upstream link cannot offer or that the downstream link cannot accept. However, if
the SO does not have perfect knowledge about the disruptions, the SO may request a flow
that cannot be achieved. Therefore, the second and third terms in the right-hand side of
(2) may become active if the control input is generated based on incomplete or incorrect
information.
For any initial condition S(0) = s ∈ S and X(0) = x ∈ X , the evolution of traffic
densities X(t) is governed by the conservation law associated with the actual flows:
d
dt
X1(t) = G
µ
1(S(t), X(t)) := α−
∑
j∈O1
qµ1j
(
S(t), X(t)
)
, (3a)
d
dt
Xk(t) = G
µ
k(S(t), X(t)) :=
∑
i∈Ik
qµik
(
S(t), X(t)
)
−
∑
j∈Ok
qµkj
(
S(t), X(t)
)
, k ∈ K \ {1, K},
(3b)
d
dt
XK(t) = G
µ
K(S(t), X(t)) :=
∑
i∈Ik
qµik
(
S(t), X(t)
)
− fK(S(t), X(t)). (3c)
It also defines the vector field Gµ : S × X → RK specifying the flow dynamics. Note that
Assumptions 1–3 ensure that X(t) is continuous in t. Importantly, Gµ is bounded and
cooperative [34] as stated in Lemmas 2 and 3, which are proved in Appendix A.2 and A.3
respectively.
Lemma 2 (Boundedness). Gµk(s, x) is bounded for each k ∈ K.
Lemma 3 (Cooperativity). For each k ∈ K, Gµk(s, x) is non-increasing in xk and Gµ` (s, x)
is non-decreasing in xk for ` ∈ Ok ∪ Ik.
The joint evolution of S(t) and X(t) is a piecewise-deterministic Markov process (PDMP)
and can be described compactly using an infinitesimal generator [29, 43]
L g(s, x) = Gµ(s, x)T∇xg(s, x) +
∑
s′∈S
λs,s′
(
g(s′, x)− g(s, x)
)
.
for any differentiable function g : S × X → RK , where ∇xg(s, x) is the gradient of g with
respect to x.
2.3 Additional definitions
In this subsection, we introduce some definitions that we will use for our subsequent argu-
ments.
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2.3.1 Stability
A key step for both throughput analysis and control design is to determine the stability of
the network under certain controls. We say that the network is stable if there exists Z <∞
such that for any initial condition (s, x) ∈ S × X
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
τ=0
E[|X(τ)|]dτ ≤ Z. (4)
This notion of stability follows a classical definition [13], which can be called “first-moment
stable” [44]. Practically, network stability means that the traffic densities in all links are
bounded on average.
2.3.2 Invariant set
An invariant set X µ under a control law µ is a closed subset of the continuous state space X
such that for each initial condition (s, x) ∈ S × X µ, we have X(t) ∈ X µ for t ≥ 0. That is,
if the continuous process {X(t), t ≥ 0} starts within X µ, then it will always remain within
X µ, regardless of the discrete process {S(t); t ≥ 0}. In addition, define
x¯µk := sup
x∈Xµ
xk, k ∈ K, (5a)
xµk := inf
x∈Xµ
xk, k ∈ K. (5b)
Note that x¯µk may be infinite.
2.3.3 Throughput and min-cut capacities
The throughput αµ of a network with control µ is defined as the maximal demand that the
network can accept while maintaining stability:
αµ := supα s.t. network is stable. (6)
A network’s throughput is closely related to the network’s min-cut capacity (MCC) that
equals the maximum network flow [37]. A cut C is a partition of vertices of a graph into
two disjoint subsets [22]. Let C be the set of cuts. For a network with a set of links K and
constant link capacities {Fk; k ∈ K}, the min-cut capacity is defined as
C(Fk;K) := minC∈C
∑
k∈C
Fk. (7)
2.3.4 Flow ratios
We first define diverging ratios
βkj =
u∗kj∑
`∈Ok u
∗
k`
, j ∈ Ok (8)
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for link k ∈ K, where u∗kj are the solutions to following linear programming:
(P1) max
u∈RNp≥0
u1
s.t. u1 =
∑
j∈O1
u1j, (9a)∑
i∈Ik
uik =
∑
j∈Ok
ukj, ∀k ∈ K \ {1, K}, (9b)
uK =
∑
i∈IK
uiK , (9c)∑
i∈Ik
uik ≤
∑
s∈S
psFs,k,∀k ∈ K \ {1}, (9d)∑
j∈Ok
ukj ≤
∑
s∈S
psFs,k, ∀k ∈ K \ {K}. (9e)
Note that P1 can be recognized as the maximum flow problem and we have maxu1 =
C(
∑
s∈S psFs,k;K).
Further, we recursively define flow ratios
γmk :=
∑
i∈Ik
γmiβik. (10)
where γii := 1. One can see that γmk is defined if and only if link k is accessible from link
m. The flow ratios have the following lemma that is proved in Appendix A.4.
Lemma 4. For any demand α < C(
∑
s∈S psFs,k;K), we have γ1kα <
∑
s∈S psFs,k.
3 Throughput analysis
In this section, we analyze a network’s stability and throughput under given controls. The
main results are sufficient conditions that check whether the network is stable given a demand
and control law (Theorem 1 and Proposition 1). They allow quantitative analysis of network
throughput.
To state the result, we first define the following sets:
Kµ := {k ∈ K : x¯µk =∞}, Mµk := Kµ ∩Mk, M˜µk :=Mk \Mµk , N µk := Kµ ∩Nk.
Besides, define N˜ µk as the set of links such that for any link j ∈ N˜ µk and over the invariant
set X µ, (i) j is accessible from k, (ii) j can be congested, (iii) j can cause spillback, and (iv)
every link between k and j satisfies (i), (ii), (iii). Here congestion means that traffic density
exceeds the critical density and spillback means that the desired flow into link j is less than
the receiving flow offered by link j.
We also define
Iµk (s, x) :=
∑
m∈Mk
γmkG
µ
m(s, x) +
∑
i∈Ik
qµik(s, x) (11)
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and
Oµk (s, x) :=
∑
j∈Ok
qµkj(s, x)−
∑
n˜∈N˜µk
ρµn˜(xn˜)G
µ
n˜(s, x) (12)
where ρµn˜ : R≥0 → R≥0 is given below:
ρµn˜(xn˜) =

0 xn˜ < x
µ
n˜,
xn˜−xµn
x¯µn˜−xµn˜
xµn˜ ≤ xn˜ < x¯µn˜,
1 xn˜ ≥ x¯µn˜.
(13)
Finally, we state the main result as follows:
Theorem 1 (Stability condition). Consider a network with a demand α and a control µ :
S×X → RNp≥0. Suppose that the network admits an invariant set X µ ⊆ X . Then, the network
is stable if ∑
s∈S
ps
(
Iµ∗k (s)−Oµ∗k (s)
)
< 0 (14)
for any k ∈ Kµ and s ∈ S, where ps are steady-state probabilities of the disruption mode
given by (1a) – (1c) and
Iµ∗k (s) := max I
µ
k (s, x) (15a)
s.t. xm ∈ [xµm, xcm], m ∈Mµk
xm˜ ∈ X µm˜, m˜ ∈ M˜µk
xk = x
c
k
x` = x¯
µ
` , o.w.,
Oµ∗k (s) := min O
µ
k (s, x) (15b)
s.t. xn˜ ∈ X µn˜ , n˜ ∈ N˜ µk
xk = x
c
k
x` = x¯
µ
` , o.w.
One can analyze the network’s throughput by finding the supremum of those demands α
that satisfy the criterion (14). Since this criterion is a sufficient condition, it in general leads
to a lower bound for the network’s throughput. But this sufficient condition for stability
is also necessary in particular settings, such as networks with infinite link storage spaces
(see Theorem 3). Verifying (14) involves solving a set of maximization and minimization
problems (15a)–(15b) only over compact sets. This is a significant contribution with respect
to the general stability criteria, which essentially require maximization over the possibly
unbounded set X µ [32].
To implement Theorem 1, one can either use insights about the flow dynamics to analyt-
ically solve the maximization and minimization problems or use numerical heuristics. The
former is particularly relevant for proving properties of certain controls, such as Theorems 2
12
and 3 in the next section. The latter is relevant for analyzing the stability of networks with
given parameters, such as the example in Section 3.1.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on Foster-Lyapunov criterion [32] (Section 3.2). By
sightly increasing the complexity of the Lyapunov function, we derive a second and tighter
stability condition:
Proposition 1. Consider a network with a demand α and a control µ : S × X → RNp≥0.
Suppose that the network admits an invariant set X µ ⊆ X under the control µ.Then the
network is stable if
Gµk(s, x) +
∑
m∈Mk
γmkG
µ
m(s, x) +
∑
n˜∈N˜µk
(
ρµn˜(xn˜)G
µ
n˜(s, x) + ρ˙(xn˜)b
s
kn˜
+ ρ(xn˜)
∑
s′∈S
λs,s′(b
s′
kn˜ − bskn˜)
)
< 0, ∀(s, x) ∈ S × X µ, k ∈ Kµ. (16)
where a set of parameters bskn˜ satisfies
1
2
xµk +
∑
m∈Mk
γmkx
µ
m +
∑
n˜∈N˜µk
(∫ xn˜
xµn˜
ρ(ξ)dξ + ρ(xn˜)b
s
kn˜
)
≥ 0, ∀(s, x) ∈ S × X µ. (17)
Proposition 1 indicates that one might find a tighter bound by solving
max
x,bskn˜
α s.t. (16)–(17).
However, it could require heavy computation costs due to the nonlinear constraints (16) and
(17).
The rest of this section is devoted to a numerical example for throughput analysis based
on the stability condition (Section 3.1) and the proof of Theorem 1 (Section 3.2) and Propo-
sition 1 (Section 3.3).
3.1 Numerical example
Consider the network in Figure 2, which is a classical example network for traffic control
[45]. The sending flow function of link k is given by
fk(s, xk) = min{vfxk, Fs,k},
where vf > 0 is a coefficient of free-flow speed [38] and Fs,k is the capacity of link k in mode
s. The receiving flow functions are given by
rk(xk) =
{
Fk − wc(xk − xck), link k has finite storage space,
∞, link k has infinite storage space,
where Fk is the nominal capacity and x
c
k is the critical density of link k, and wc > 0 is a
coefficient of congestion-wave speed [38]. For the maximum densities, we have
xmaxk =
{
xck + Fk/wc, link k has finite storage space,
∞, link k has infinite storage space.
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Figure 2: A single-origin-single-destination network with two diverges and two merges.
In this example, we set vf = wc = 1. Figure 2 shows the values for Fk and x
c
k.
Link 5 is subject to the cyber disruption, which makes the traffic state x5 appear to be
zero to the system oprator. Links 6 is subject to the physical disruption, which reduces the
capacity of link 6 to zero. Table 1 specifies the cyber disruption characterized by the fault
mapping Ts,5(x5) and the physical disruption characterized by the mode-specific capacity
Fs,6. The other links are not subject to disruptions; i.e. Ts,k(xk) = xk for all s and all k 6= 5,
and Fs,k = Fk for all s and all k 6= 6. Hence, the network has four modes.
Table 1: Modes of network in Figure 2
Mode 1 2 3 4
Ts,5(x5) x5 x5 0 0
Fs,6 1 0 1 0
If the network suffers the cyber and physical disruption simultaneously, the mode tran-
sition rate matrix is
Λ =

− ∑
s′ 6=1
λ1s′ λ12 λ13 λ14
λ21 −
∑
s′ 6=2
λ2s′ λ23 λ24
λ31 λ32 −
∑
s′ 6=3
λ3s′ λ34
λ41 λ42 λ43 −
∑
s′ 6=4
λ4s′

=

−2 1 1 0
1 −2 0 1
1 0 −2 1
0 1 1 −2
 .
where λs,s′ denotes the transition rate from mode s to mode s
′ [46]. The steady-state
probabilities ps can be computed for the mode s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}:
p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = 1/4.
At the diverges, the traffic flows are routed according to the classical logit model:
q12(s, x) = min
{ e−νx2
e−νx2 + e−νTs,5(x5)
f1(s, x1), r2(x2)
}
,
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q15(s, x) = min
{ e−νTs,5(x5)
e−νx2 + e−νTs,5(x5)
f1(s, x1), r5(x5)
}
,
q23(s, x) = min
{ e−νx3
e−νx3 + e−νx4
f2(s, x2), r3(x3)
}
,
q24(s, x) = min
{ e−νx4
e−νx3 + e−νx4
f2(s, x2), r4(x4)
}
.
In this example, we select ν = 2 as the sensitivity coefficient. At the merges, we assume
that one incoming link is strictly prioritized over the other. Specifically, at merge 1 link 4 is
prioritized over link 5, and at merge 2 link 3 is prioritized over link 6. Such priorities can be
realized by
q46(s, x) = min{f4(s, x4), r6(x6)},
q56(s, x) = min{f5(s, x5), r6(x6)− q46(s, x)},
q37(s, x) = min{f3(s, x3), r7(x7)},
q67(s, x) = min{f6(s, x6), r7(x7)− q37(s, x)}.
Before we apply Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 to derive the throughput given different
storage spaces and disruptions, we construct the following rectangular invariant set:
X logit = [xlogit1 ,∞)×
7∏
k=2
[xlogitk , x¯
logit
k ] = [α/vf ,∞)×
7∏
k=2
[xlogitk , x¯
logit
k ].
We start from the lower boundary. If link 5 is free from the cyber disruption, we have
xlogit2 = x
logit
5 = min{vfxlogit1 , F1}/2vf , otherwise xlogit2 = ω2 and xlogit5 = ω5, where ω2 and ω5
are the solutions to the following system of equations:
min{vfxlogit1 , F1}
e−νω2
e−νω2 + 1
= vfω2,
min{vfxlogit1 , F1}
e−νω5
e−νω2 + e−νω5
= vfω5.
Then, according to the network structure, we have the following relationships for the lower
boundary of link k = 2, · · · , 7:
xlogit3 = x
logit
4 = min{vfxlogit2 , F2}/2vf ,
xlogit6 = (min{vfxlogit4 , F4}+ min{vfxlogit5 , F5})/vf ,
xlogit7 = (min{vfxlogit3 , F3}+ min{vfxlogit6 , Fmin6 })/vf ,
where Fmin6 = 0 if link 6 is subject to the physical disruption, otherwise F
min
6 = 1.
The upper boundary is discussed based on whether the the link storage is infinite. First,
we consider the first case of infinite storage spaces. We have x¯logit2 = x¯
logit
5 = F1/2vf if there
is no cyber disruptions affecting link 5, otherwise x¯logit2 = σ2, x¯
logit
5 = σ5, where σ2 and σ5
are the solutions of the following system of equations:
min{α, F1} e
−νσ′2
e−νσ′2 + 1
= vfσ
′
2,
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min{α, F1} 1
e−νσ′2 + 1
= vfσ5,
min{α, F1} e
−νσ2
e−νσ2 + e−νσ5
= vfσ2.
For the upper boundaries of other links, there are the following relationships:
x¯logit3 = x¯
logit
4 = min{vf x¯logit2 , F2}/2vf ,
x¯logit6 =
{
f¯6/vf , f¯6 < F
min
6 ,
∞, o.w.,
x¯logit7 = (min{vf x¯logit3 , F3}+ min{vf x¯logit6 , Fmax6 })/vf ,
where f¯6 := min{vf x¯logit4 , F4}+ min{vf x¯logit5 , Fmax5 } and Fmax6 = 1.
Then we consider the second case of finite storage spaces. If there are no physical dis-
ruptions, the upper boundaries can be computed in the aforementioned way. Otherwise, we
have
x¯logitk1 = x
max
k1
, k1 ∈ {2, 4, 5, 6}, x¯logitk2 = xck2 , k2 ∈ {3, 7},
where the densities of link 2, 4, 5, 6 attain the maximum value due to congestion spillback.
Table 2 lists the network throughput in various scenarios, where αlogitt , α
logit
p and α
logit
sim
denote the throughput derived from Theorem 1, Proposition 1 and the numerical simulation,
respectively. We can see the simulation value αlogitsim as the true boundary. It is reasonable to
find that Proposition 1 leads to a tighter bound than Theorem 1.
The results demonstrate that cyber-physical disruptions will decrease the network perfor-
mance. For instance, shown in Table 2, the throughput decreases to 0.944 when the network
with finite space suffers physical disruptions. It further reduces to 0.800 when the network
is also subject to cyber disruptions. A counter-intuitive finding is that disruptions have
more significant impacts given the infinite link storage space. The reason lies in that the
congestion in link 6 will not affect the upstream routing at diverge 1 and 2 because link 6 has
infinite storage. This finding shows that inappropriate controls will also result in throughput
loss.
Table 2: Network throughput in various scenarios
Storage Cyber disruptions Physical disruptions αlogitt α
logit
p α
logit
sim
infinite no no 1 1 1
infinite yes no 1 1 1
infinite no yes 0.667 0.667 0.667
infinite yes yes 0.573 0.573 0.643
finite no no 1 1 1
finite yes no 1 1 1
finite no yes 0.745 0.800 0.944
finite yes yes 0.576 0.688 0.800
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3.2 Proof of Theorem 1
This proof uses a Lyapunov function-based approach. To show the network’s stability, we
only need to show the boundedness of the traffic densities in link k ∈ Kµ. Besides, we
only need to consider initial conditions in the invariant set X µ [43]. Consider the Lyapunov
function V : S × X µ → R below:
V (s, x) =
∑
k∈Kµ
akxk
(1
2
xk +
∑
m∈Mk
γmkxm +
∑
n˜∈N˜µk
∫ xn˜
xµn˜
ρ(ξ)dξ + bsk
)
.
We prove Theorem 1 by showing that if (14) holds, then there exist constants ak > 0,
bsk ≥ 0, c > 0, and d <∞ that satisfy the following criterion:
Foster-Lyapunov criterion [32]. Consider a Markov process {Y (t) : t ≥ 0} with state
space Y, an infinitesimal generator L , and a Lyapunov function W : Y → R≥0. If there
exist constants c > 0, d <∞ and a function g : Y → R≥0 such that
LW (y) ≤ −cg(y) + d, ∀y ∈ Y ,
then, for each initial condition y(0) ∈ Y,
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
τ=0
E[g(Y (τ))]dτ ≤ d/c.
To proceed, apply the infinitesimal generator L to the Lyapunov function V :
L V (s, x) =
∑
k∈Kµ
(
Dµk (s, x)xk + akG
µ
k(s, x)
( ∑
m˜∈M˜µk
γm˜kxm˜ +
∑
n˜∈N˜µk
∫ xn˜
xµn˜
ρµn˜(ξ)dξ + b
s
k
))
,
where Dµk (s, x) is given by
Dµk (s, x) =ak
(
Gµk(s, x) +
∑
m∈Mk
γmkG
µ
m(s, x) +
∑
n˜∈N˜µk
ρµn˜(xn˜)G
µ
n˜(s, x) +
∑
s′∈S
λs,s′(b
s′
k − bsk)
)
+
∑
n∈Nµk
anγknG
µ
n(s, x).
Note that xm˜ is bounded for each m˜ ∈ M˜µk and that xn˜ is bounded for each n˜ ∈ N˜ µk . Besides,
Lemma 2 shows that Gµk(s, x) is also bounded. So there exists d0 <∞ such that
L V (s, x) ≤
∑
k∈Kµ
Dµk (s, x)xk + d0, ∀(s, x) ∈ S × X µ.
In the following, we prove that there exist c > 0 and dk < ∞ for any link k ∈ Kµ such
that
Dµk (s, x)xk ≤ −cxk + dk, ∀(s, x) ∈ S × X µ. (18)
We discuss two cases: 1) xk ≤ xck and 2) xk > xck. If xk ≤ xck, we have dk = sups,xDµk (s, x)xk+
cxk <∞ given any c > 0 because Dµk (s, x) is bounded.
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In case of xk > x
c
k, according to Lemmas 1 and 3, we have
Iµk (s, x) ≤ Iµ∗k (s), Oµk (s, x) ≥ Oµ∗k (s)
for any link k ∈ Kµ with xk > xck. Then,
Gµk(s, x) +
∑
m∈Mk
γmkG
µ
m(s, x) +
∑
n˜∈N˜µk
ρµn˜(xn˜)G
µ
n˜(s, x)
=Iµk (s, x)−Oµk (s, x) ≤ Iµ∗k (s)−Oµ∗k (s) = zsk,
where the definition zsk is clear from the above. Then, b
s
k are the solutions to
zsk +
∑
s′∈S
λs,s′(b
s′
k − bsk) =
∑
s′∈S
ps′z
s′
k , s ∈ S, k ∈ Kµ. (19)
The existence of bsk is guaranteed by the following technical result, which we prove in Ap-
pendix A.5:
Lemma 5. The system of equations (19) has a non-negative solution for bsk, s ∈ S, k ∈ Kµ.
To show the existence of ak, note that G
µ
n(s, x) is bounded; hence there exists δ < ∞
such that
Dµk (s, x) ≤ ak
∑
s∈S
psz
s
k + δ
∑
n∈Nµk
an, ∀k ∈ Kµ.
Since (14) implies that
∑
s∈S psz
s
k < 0 for each k ∈ Kµ, the existence of ak is guaranteed
by the following technical result, which we prove in Appendix A.6:
Lemma 6. The system of equations
ηkak + δ
∑
n∈Nµk
an < 0, ∀k ∈ Kµ (20)
has a strictly positive solution for ak if ηk < 0 for each k ∈ Kµ.
So if xk > x
c
k, there exists c > 0 satisfying D
µ
k (s, x)xk ≤ −cxk. Combining the results in
the two cases of xk ≤ xck and xk > xck shows that there exist c > 0 and dk < ∞ satisfying
(18) for any link k ∈ Kµ.
Finally, let d = d0 +
∑
k dk, we have
L V (s, x) ≤ −c
∑
k∈Kµ
xk + d, ∀(s, x) ∈ S × X µ.
It indicates that we can conclude stability of the network by the Foster-Lyapunov criterion.
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3.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the Lyapnov function
V (s, x) =
∑
k∈Kµ
akxk
(
1
2
xk +
∑
m∈Mk
γmkxm +
∑
n˜∈N˜µk
(∫ xn˜
xµn˜
ρ(ξ)dξ + ρ(xn˜)b
s
kn˜
))
.
Since (17) ensures this Lyapunov function to be non-negative, we can apply Foster-Lynapunov
criterion. Note that this Lyapunov function is non-differentiable with respect to xk at x
µ
k
and x¯µk , but it is right-differentiable (resp. left-differentiable) with respect to xk at x
µ
k (resp.
x¯µk). The infinitesimal generator L gives
L V (s, x) =
∑
k∈Kµ
(
Dµk (s, x)xk + akG
µ
k(s, x)
( ∑
m˜∈M˜µk
γm˜kxm˜ +
∑
n˜∈N˜µk
(∫ xn˜
xµn˜
ρµn˜(ξ)dξ + ρ(xn˜)b
s
kn˜
)))
where Dµk (s, x) is given by
Dµk (s, x) =ak
(
Gµk(s, x) +
∑
m∈Mk
γmkG
µ
m(s, x) +
∑
n˜∈N˜µk
(
ρµn˜(xn˜)G
µ
n˜(s, x)
+ ρ˙(xn˜)b
s
kn˜ + ρ(xn˜)
∑
s′∈S
λs,s′(b
s′
kn˜ − bskn˜)
))
+
∑
n∈Nµk
anγknG
µ
n(s, x).
According to the proof of Theorem 1, we need only prove
Gµk(s, x)+
∑
m∈Mk
γmkG
µ
m(s, x) +
∑
n˜∈N˜µk
(
ρµn˜(xn˜)G
µ
n˜(s, x)
+ ρ˙(xn˜)b
s
kn˜ + ρ(xn˜)
∑
s′∈S
λs,s′(b
s′
kn˜ − bskn˜)
)
< 0, ∀(s, x) ∈ S × X µ, k ∈ Kµ.
So given (16), we can conclude that Foster-Lyapunov criterion is achieved.
4 Control design
In this section, we design control laws to improve network throughput. A classical result
in network control is the max-flow min-cut theorem, which characterizes the maximally
attainable throughput in terms of link capacities [37]. We will extend the notion of min-cut
capacity (MCC) to stochastic networks and present a series of results characterizing the
throughput under various classes of control laws.
Two extensions of MCC are considered in the stochastic setting. The min-expected-cut
capacity (MECC) is the minimum cut capacity evaluated with the expected capacity of each
link:
M := C
(∑
s∈S
psFs,k;K
)
. (21)
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The expected-min-cut capacity (EMCC) is the expected minimum cut capacity over various
modes:
E :=
∑
s∈S
psC(Fs,k;K). (22)
The MECC and the EMCC are in general not equal. In fact, one can show that the MECC is
no less than the EMCC. Figure 3 illustrates the EMCC (0.75) and MECC (1) of the network
in Figure 2, where the min-cuts are highlighted as solid arrows.
1 1 0.5
1 1
20.5
(a) min-cut in mode 1&3
1 1 0.5
1 0
20.5
(b) min-cut in mode 2&4
1 1 0.5
1 0.5
20.5
(c) min-expected-cut
Figure 3: EMCC and MECC
Next, we investigate in which case there exist controls that attain EMCC/MECC. We
show that i) for a network with observable disruption modes, there exists a mode-dependent
control that attains the EMCC (Theorem 2) and (ii) for a network with infinite link storage
spaces, there exists an open-loop control that attains the MECC (Theorem 3). However,
MECC might not be attainable in general cases. So we also design a closed-loop control with
a guaranteed lower-bound (Theorem 4).
For the mode-aware setting, we derive Theorem 2 that is analogous to the classical max-
flow min-cut theorem [37]. It states that there exists a mode-dependent control that attains
the minimum expected cut capacity. The control is given by
µmdkj (s) = u
∗
kj(s), (23)
where u∗kj(s) is the optimal solution to the linear program
(P2) max
u∈RNp≥0
∑
k∈K,j∈Ok
ukj(s)
s.t.
∑
j∈Ok
ukj(s) ≤ fk(s, xck), ∀k ∈ K, (24a)∑
i∈Ik
uik(s) ≤ rk(s, xck), ∀k ∈ K \ {1}, (24b)∑
i∈Ik
uik(s)−
∑
j∈Ok
ukj(s) = 0, ∀k ∈ K \ {1}. (24c)
Theorem 2 (Max-flow expected-min-cut). Consider a dynamic flow network with a demand
α. Suppose that the system operator can correctly observe the mode S(t) for t ≥ 0. Then,
µmd given by (23) attains the expected-min-cut capacity
∑
s∈S psC(Fs,k;K).
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Theorem 3 is used if every link has an infinite storage space. This theorem states that
there exists a control that attains the minimum expected cut capacity without observing
disruption modes and network states. The control is as follows:
µolkj = γkjF
max
k , (25)
where Fmaxk denotes among Fs,k.
Theorem 3 (Max-flow min-expected-cut). Consider a dynamic flow network with infinite
link storage spaces and with demand α. Then, the open-loop control µol given by (25) attains
the min-expected-cut capacity C
(∑
s∈S psFs,k;K
)
.
For general network (with incorrect sensing/actuating or with finite link storage spaces),
one can indeed apply Theorem 1 to obtain a closed-loop control. However, since Theorem 1
considers general control, the relation between the control µ and the throughput αµ is not
an explicit one. To facilitate control design, we restrict the structure of the control such that
x¯µk <∞, ∀k 6= 1, (26)∑
i∈Ik
µik(s, x) ≤ rk(s, x), ∀x ∈ X µ, k 6= 1. (27)
Note that the control input could be modified by disruption modes. The constraint (26)
ensures densities are bounded except in link 1, and the constraint (27) requires that the
controlled inflow does not exceed the receiving flow. For such a restricted control, we derive
the following lower bound.
Theorem 4 (Lower-bounded throughput). Consider a dynamic flow network with a control
µdd that satisfies (26)–(27). Suppose that the network admits an invariant set X µ under
control µdd. Then, µdd can attain a throughput lower-bounded by
αµ ≥
∑
s∈S
ps min
xn˜∈Xµ:n˜∈N˜µ1
x1=xc1
x`=x¯
µ
` ,o.w.
(∑
j∈O1
min{µ1j(s, x), µ1j(s, x)∑
`∈O1 µ1`(s, x)
f1(s, x)}
−
∑
n˜∈N˜µ1
ρn˜(xn˜)
(∑
i∈In˜
min{µin˜(s, x), µin˜(s, x)∑
`∈Oi µi`(s, x)
fi(s, x)}
−
∑
j∈On˜
min{µn˜j(s, x), µn˜j(s, x)∑
`∈On˜ µn˜`(s, x)
fn˜(s, x)}
))
. (28)
This result is significantly simpler than Theorem 1 in terms of computation, since the
lower-bound is independent of demand α. Hence, we can directly use this result for control
design.
The rest of this section first illustrates the above results with a numerical example (Section
4.1) and then proves them respectively (Section 4.2–4.4).
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4.1 Numerical example
Consider again the network in Figure 2. We apply our results to three control laws in various
scenarios. The three control laws are open-loop µol, mode-dependent µmd, and density-
dependent µdd. The open-loop control assigns constant flows between links, independent
of both the mode and the traffic densities. The mode-dependent control adjusts the flows
according to the mode but independent of the traffic densities. The density-dependent control
determines the flows according to the traffic densities and independent of the mode. More
details of the three controls are available in Section 4.1.1–4.1.3.
Table 3: Comparison between different control laws
Control law Mode-dependent Open-loop Density-dependent
Require observation of mode s ? Yes No No
Require knowledge of transition rates λs,s′? No Yes No
Require observation of densities xk ? No No Yes
Storage
Cyber
disruptions
Physical
disruptions
αmdt α
md
p α
md
sim α
ol
t α
ol
p α
ol
sim α
dd
t α
dd
p α
dd
sim
infinite no no 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
infinite yes no 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
infinite no yes 0.750 0.750 0.750 1 1 1 0.746 0.844 0.943
infinite yes yes 0.750 0.750 0.750 1 1 1 0.746 0.844 0.943
finite no no 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
finite yes no 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
finite no yes 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.730 0.885 0.928 0.747 0.874 0.970
finite yes yes 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.730 0.885 0.928 0.727 0.855 0.958
Table 3 first summarizes the main features of the control laws. It clearly illustrates the
pros and cons of these controls. Importantly, the open-loop controls requires prior knowledge
of the inter-mode transition rates, which may not be easily obtained in practice. Further-
more, observation of mode requires quick detection of disruptions, which may not be easy in
practice. Hence, density-dependent control is more practical. However, density-dependent
control relies on traffic state observation and is thus vulnerable to cyber disruptions, such
as sensing faults, while the mode-dependent and open-loop control are not.
Besides, Table 3 lists the control performance in various scenarios, where the subscripts
“t”, “p” and “sim” denote the throughput derived from Theorem 1, Proposition 1 and the
numerical simulation. To implement Theorem 1 and Proposition 1, we design the rectangular
invariant sets for each control, which is similar to that for the logit routing.
The results successfully verify Theorem 2 and 3. The expected-min-cut capacity (EMCC)
subject to (resp. free from) the physical disruptions equals 0.75 (resp. 1) and is attainable
given the mode-dependent control; the min-expected-cut capacity (MECC) equals 1 and is
available under the open-loop control when all the links have infinite storage spaces. When
the link storage spaces become finite, the open-loop control might not attain MECC mainly
due to spillback.
The results also support the statement that density-dependent control is vulnerable to
cyber disruptions. For instance, if every link has an finite storage space, the throughput
under the density-dependent control deceases due to cyber disruptions. Note that density-
dependent control does not perform better given the infinite storage spaces. It is because
the control is more restricted to prevent the traffic density x5 from being boundless when
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the network is subject to cyber disruptions (Section 4.1.3).
We also compare the designed controls with the classical routing policy (Table 2). The
comparison reveals that µmd, µol and µdd outperform the classical control in most cases.
Next, we present and discuss details about the three controls.
4.1.1 Mode-dependent control
The control µmd is obtained from solving the linear programming P2 for each disruption
mode s. Then we have
µmd12 (s) = µ
md
23 (s) = µ
md
37 (s) = θs,
µmd24 (s) = 0,
µmd15 (s) = µ
md
56 (s) = µ
md
67 (s) = φs,
where θs and φs are listed in Table 4. Note that there are no flows from link 2 to link 4, so
link 4 can be neglected.
Table 4: Optimal values for parameters of µmd.
mode 1 2 3 4
θs 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
φs 1 0 1 0
4.1.2 Open-loop control
Solving the linear programming P1 gives u∗12 = u
∗
23 = u
∗
37 = u
∗
15 = u
∗
56 = u
∗
67 = 0.5 and
u∗24 = u
∗
46 = 0. Then we can compute γkj and use (25) to obtain the following open-loop
control
µol12 = µ
ol
23 = µ
ol
37 = 0.5, µ
ol
24 = 0,
µol15 = µ
ol
56 = 0.5, µ
ol
67 = 1.
Similarly, flows are not allowed from link 2 to link 4 and only six links need to be considered.
4.1.3 Density-dependent control
We design the following density-dependent control:
µdd12 (s, x) = 2− x2, µdd56 (s, x) = 2− x6,
µdd15 (s, x) =
{
min{2− T5(s, x5), 2− x6}, link 5 has infinite storage spaces,
2− T5(s, x5), link 5 has finite storage spaces,
where T5(s, x5) is the fault mapping given in Table 1. Since link 3 and 7 will not be congested,
it is not necessary to control the flows into them. When link 5 has infinite storage, the
controlled inflow is more restricted to prevent the traffic density x5 from being boundless.
Note that Theorem 4 can be used except when the links with finite storage spaces are subject
to both cyber and physical disruptions because (27) does not hold in this case.
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4.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We prove Theorem 2 mainly based on Theorem 1. The proof involves Lemma 7, which we
prove in the appendix.
Lemma 7. Under the control µmd defined in (23), the network admits N˜ µ1 = ∅ and Kµ =
{1}.
Lemma 7 indicates that we only need to consider Iµ1 (s, x) and O
µ
1 (s, x) according to
Theorem 1, and we have∑
s∈S
ps(I
µ∗
1 (s)−Oµ∗1 (s)) = α−
∑
s∈S
ps
∑
j∈O1
µmd1j (s).
Note that O1 is a cut, so we have
∑
j∈O1 µ
md
1j (s) = C(Fs,k;K). Finally, Theorem 1 says that
the system will be stable if α <
∑
s∈S psC(Fs,k;K). It means µmd attains the expected-min-
cut capacity
∑
s∈S psC(Fs,k;K).
4.3 Proof of Theorem 3
4.3.1 Sufficiency
This proof is similar to that of Theorem 1. Note that we have N˜ µk = ∅ because all the links
have infinite storage and congestion spillback will not happen, so we consider the reduced
Lyapunov function
V (s, x) =
∑
k∈Kµ
akxk
(1
2
xk +
∑
m∈Mk
γmkxm + b
s
k
)
.
Then, apply the infinitesimal generator L to the Lyapunov function V :
L V (s, x) =
∑
k∈Kµ
(
ak
(
Gµk(s, x) +
∑
m∈Mk
γmkG
µ
m(s, x)
)
+
∑
n∈Nµk
anγknG
µ
n(s, x)
)
xk.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we need only prove
Gµk(s, x) +
∑
m∈Mk
γmkG
µ
m(s, x)
∣∣∣
xk>x
c
k
< 0, ∀k ∈ Kµ.
Note that, for any link m ∈Mk, we have∑
j∈Om
γmkqmj(s, x)−
∑
`∈Om∩Mk
γ`kqm`(s, x)
=
∑
j∈Om
γmkγmjfm(s, x)−
∑
`∈Om∩Mk
γ`kγm`fm(s, x)
=γmkfm(s, x)− γmkfm(s, x) = 0.
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So we obtain
Gµk(s, x) +
∑
m∈Mk
γmkG
µ
m(s, x)
∣∣∣
xk>x
c
k
≤ γ1kα− Fmaxk .
According to Lemma 4, we further have
γ1kα− Fmaxk <
∑
s∈S
psFs,k − Fmaxk ≤ 0,
given any α < C(
∑
s∈S psFs,k;K). So the system will be stable if α < C(
∑
s∈S psFs,k;K). It
means the open-loop control µol attains the min-expected-cut capacity.
4.3.2 Necessity
Let C∗ = arg minC
∑
k∈C,s∈S psFs,k be the min-expected-cut and XC∗(t) be the vector of the
states of C∗ and its upstream links. Suppose α = C(∑s∈S psFs,k;K), then the control law
µol gives
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
τ=0
E[|XC∗(τ)|]dτ = |XC∗(0)|.
This implies
lim sup
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
τ=0
E[|X(τ)|]dτ ≥ |XC∗(0)|,
and we cannot find Z <∞ such that (4) holds for any initial condition. So the system under
the control defined in (25) is stable only if α < C(
∑
s∈S psFs,k;K).
4.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Note that (26) indicates Kµ = {1}. According to Theorem 1, the network is stable if∑
s∈S
ps
(
Iµ∗1 (s)−Oµ∗1 (s)
)
= α−
∑
s∈S
ps min
xn˜∈Xµ:n˜∈N˜µ1
x1=xc1
x`=x¯
µ
` ,o.w.
Oµ1 (s, x) < 0 (29)
where Oµ1 (s, x) is given below
Oµ1 (s, x) =
∑
j∈O1
qµ1j(s, x)−
∑
n˜∈N˜µ1
ρµn˜(xn˜)G
µ
n˜(s, x)
=
∑
j∈O1
min{µ1j(s, x), µ1j(s, x)∑
`∈O1 µ1`(s, x)
f1(s, x)}
−
∑
n˜∈N˜µ1
ρn˜(xn˜)
(∑
i∈In˜
min{µin˜(s, x), µin˜(s, x)∑
`∈Oi µi`(s, x)
fi(s, x)}
−
∑
j∈On˜
min{µn˜j(s, x), µn˜j(s, x)∑
`∈On˜ µn˜`(s, x)
fn˜(s, x)}
)
.
So (29) indicates the lower bound given by (28).
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5 Concluding remarks
We propose a novel approach to the analysis and design of traffic control for dynamic flow net-
works suffering cyber-physical disruptions. First, we apply piecewise-deterministic Markov
process to modeling disruptions and their impacts on network dynamics. Then, a stability
condition (Theorem 1) is derived with the Lyapunov-based method. By slightly changing
the Lyapunov function, we derive a stronger stability condition (Proposition 1). The stabil-
ity analysis contributes to two specific controls. The first one can attain expected-min-cut
capacity of the network if the disruptions are observable (Theorem 2); the second one can
attain min-expected-cut capacity if all the links have infinite storage space (Theorem 3).
For the general case, we also propose a density-dependent control whose lower-bounded
throughput is guaranteed (Theorem 4). The discussion shows density-dependent control is
more practical, but the numerical example also demonstrates its vulnerability to the cyber
disruptions.
This work can serve as the basis for multiple future studies. First, applying stability
condition involves constrained nonlinear optimization. Thus, it is worthwhile finding effi-
cient numerical heuristics methods, especially for large-scale networks. Second, the optimal
density-dependent control still remains to be addressed. Finally, the modeling technique and
stability analysis can be customized and applied to more specific problems, such as resilient
ramp metering.
A Appendices
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First, we show that qµkj(s, x) is non-decreasing in xk for any j ∈ Ok. To achieve that, we
check the three terms in the right-hand side of (2) respectively. According to Assumption 3,
it is clear that the first term µkj(s, x) is non-decreasing in xk for any j ∈ Ok.
Then we consider the second term. Suppose fk(s, x
′
k) = fk(s, xk) + ∆fk and µkj(s, x
′) =
µkj(s, x) + ∆µkj , where x and x
′ satisfy x′k ≥ xk and x′` = x` for ` 6= k. According to
Assumption 3, we have 0 ≤∑j∈Ok ∆µkj ≤ ∆fk . This implies ∑j∈Ok µkj(s, x′) ≤ fk(s, x′k) if∑
j∈Ok µkj(s, x) ≤ fk(s, xk). In this case, the second term is larger than the first one and
thus can be ignored. If∑
j∈Ok
µkj(s, x
′) > fk(s, x′k),
∑
j∈Ok
µkj(s, x) > fk(s, xk),
then we have
(fk(s, xk) + ∆fk)∆µkj + µkj(s, x)∆fk
µkj(s, x)
∑
j∈Ok ∆µkj
∑
j∈Ok µkj(s, x)
fk(s, xk)
≥ 1.
It indicates
µkj(s, x
′)fk(s, x′k)
/∑
j∈Ok µkj(s, x
′)
µkj(s, x)fk(s, xk)
/∑
j∈Ok µkj(s, x)
≥ 1,
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which means the second term is non-decreasing in xk.
If ∑
j∈Ok
µkj(s, x
′) ≤ fk(s, x′k),
∑
j∈Ok
µkj(s, x) > fk(s, xk),
then we have
µkj(s, x
′)∑
k∈Ok µkj(s, x
′)
fk(s, x
′
k) ≥ µkj(s, x′), µkj(s, x) ≥
µkj(s, x)∑
k∈Ok µkj(s, x)
fk(s, xk).
So the second term is also non-decreasing in xk since µkj(s, x
′) ≥ µkj(s, x).
For the third term, we have
rj(s, x) = rj(s, x
′)
and
µkj(s, x
′)
∑
j∈Ok
µkj(s, x)− µkj(s, x)
∑
j∈Ok
µkj(s, x
′) ≥ 0. (30)
Note that (30) implies
µkj(s, x
′)∑
j∈Ok µkj(s, x
′)
− µkj(s, x)∑
j∈Ok µkj(s, x)
≥ 0. (31)
So the third term is non-decreasing in xk. Finally, we can conclude that q
µ
kj(s, x) is non-
decreasing in xk for any j ∈ Ok. The monotonicity of qµik can be proved in a similar way.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Finite sending flow fk(s, x) indicates the actual flow q
µ
kj(s, x) is also limited. So G
µ
k(s, x) is
bounded for any link k.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 1 states that qµkj(s, x) is non-decreasing in xk while q
µ
ik(s, x) is non-increasing in
xk. Then, from the definition of G
µ
k(s, x) in (3a)–(3c), we can verify that G
µ
k(s, x) is non-
increasing in xk and G
µ
` (s, x) is non-decreasing in xk for ` ∈ Ok ∪ Ik.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Note u∗1 = maxu1 = C(
∑
s∈S psFs,k;K). By definition, we have γ1ku∗1 =
∑
i∈Ik u
∗
ik ≤∑
s∈S psFs,k. So this lemma holds up given any α < C(
∑
s∈S psFs,k;K).
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A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
To show the existence of bsk, we represent the involved quantities in matrix form. Let Λ be
the transition rate matrix for the discrete state process {S(t); t > 0}. That is, we number
the discrete states s ∈ S as integers 1, 2, . . . ,m, where m is the cardinality of S. Let λij
be the transition rate from the ith discrete state (say s) to the jth discrete state (say s′);
λij = λ(s, s
′). Furthermore, we define λii = −
∑
j 6=i λij for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Thus, we can
define the following matrix:
Λ :=
 −
∑
i 6=1 λ1i · · · λ1m
...
. . .
...
λm1 · · · −
∑
i 6=m λmi
 . (32)
Let p = [p1 p2 · · · pm]T be the steady-state probabilities of the discrete state process, i.e. a
row vector satisfying
pTΛ = 0, p ≥ 0, |p|= 1 (33)
where |·| is the 1-norm. One can easily show that the above is equivalent to (1a).
To show the existence of a solution, note that (19) is equivalent to
−∑
i 6=1
λ1i · · · λ1m
...
. . .
...
λm1 · · · −
∑
i 6=m
λmi
 y =
 p
Tz − z1
...
pTz − zm
 .
Since the discrete state process is ergodic, the rank of the matrix Λ is m − 1. Scaling each
row i with pi and adding the scaled rows 1,2,...,m− 1 to row m, we obtain
−p1
∑
i 6=1
λ1i · · · p1λ1m
...
. . .
...∑
i 6=1
piλi1 − p1
∑
i 6=1
λ1i · · ·
∑
i 6=m
piλim − pm
∑
i 6=m
λmi
 y =

p1(p
Tz − z1)
...
(
m∑
i=1
pi)p
Tz −
m∑
i=1
pizi
 . (34)
By (33), we know that ∑
i 6=1
piλij − pj
∑
i 6=j
λji = 0 j = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
Also note that ( m∑
i=1
pi
)
pTz −
m∑
i=1
pizi = p
Tz − pTz = 0.
Hence, the rank of the augmented coefficient matrix of the system of linear equations (34) is
also m− 1, equal to the rank of the coefficient matrix. Therefore, (34) must have a solution
[46, p.154].
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A.6 Proof of Lemma 6
If δ ≤ 0, any ak > 0 satisfies (20). In case of δ > 0, we construct ak from the downstream to
the upstream. First, we define M := supk∈Kµ ηk < 0 and N := maxk|N µk |.
If δ ≥ |M |, let ak = (− δNM )i−1 for any link k that satisfies Nk ∩Kµ = ∅ in iteration i and
then remove these links from Kµ. Thus we have
ηkak + δ
∑
n∈Nµk
an < M(−δN
M
)i−1 + δN(−δN
M
)i−2 = 0.
If δ < |M |, let ak = − δN i−1M for any link k that satisfies Nk ∩ Kµ = ∅ in iteration i and
remove these links from Kµ . So we have
ηkak + δ
∑
n∈Nµk
an < −MδN
i−1
M
− δ
2N i−1
M
< 0.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 7
To prove N˜ µ1 = ∅, we show the mode-dependent control admits an invariant set Xmd so
that the desired flow into link k 6= 1 is not less than the receiving flow rk(s, xk) for any
(s, x) ∈ S × Xmd. Note that, because of (24a), the maximum desired flow into link k 6= 1 is
given by ∑
i∈Ik
min{µmdik (s),
µmdik (s)∑
`∈Oi µ
md
i` (s)
fi(s, xi)} =
∑
i∈Ik
µmdik (s).
Then, we consider link k ∈ K from the downstream to the upstream. For link K, x¯mdK is
defined as
x¯mdK := min
s
sup{xK :
∑
i∈IK
µmdiK (s) ≤ rK(s, xK)}. (35)
Note that we have x¯mdK ≥ xcK according to Assumption 3.
Next, we prove x¯mdK is a upper bound of the invariant set XmdK . It concludes if x¯mdK =∞.
When x¯mdK < ∞, let x∗ denote any network state with x∗K > x¯mdK . Due to (24a)–(24c), we
have some mode s∗ such that
rK(s
∗, x∗K) <
∑
i∈IK
µmdiK (s
∗) ≤ fK(s∗, xcK).
Then we obtain
GmdK (s
∗, x∗) =
∑
i∈IK
qmdiK (s
∗, x∗)− fK(s∗, x∗K)
≤min{
∑
i∈IK
µmdiK (s
∗), rK(s∗, x∗K)} − fK(s∗, xcK)
<0.
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For other s 6= s∗, we also have GmdK (s, x∗) ≤ 0. Since the Markov process of disruption modes
is ergodic, xK will decrease to x¯
md
K if its initial value is larger than x¯
md
K , which implies x¯
md
K is
a upper bound of the invariant set of XmdK .
As indicated in (35), the desired flow into link K is not less than the receiving flow
rK(s, xK) given the upper bound x¯
md
K . It is also means that link K is not the bottleneck for
link i ∈ IK , and there is similar proof for each link i ∈ IK . In this way, we can verify the
links step by step.
To prove Kµ = {1}, we show that x¯mdk <∞ for any k 6= 1. Note that N˜ µ1 = ∅ indicates
there are no downstream bottlenecks and that the mode-dependent control satisfies (24c).
So, for link k 6= 1, we have xk <∞ given any finite initial value.
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